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Abstract
This thesis contributes to current literature dealing with the topic of sovereign
export promotion in form of government-back export credit agencies by analysing
a very homogenous group of Central European countries. Export credit agen-
cies in the Visegrad region indeed foster export. Different institutional forms
of export credit agencies are compared and using example of a small open
economy, the Czech Republic, it is suggested that the most profitable and
effective strategy for governments in comparable countries is to establish an
export credit agency offering insurance and export guarantees. The export
credit agency with the best performance in the region is Slovak Eximbanka.
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Táto práca prispieva k súčasnej literatúre, venujúcej sa štátnej podpore exportu
vo forme exportných úverových agentúr, analýzou homogénnej skupiny kraj́ın
strednej Európy. Exportné úverové agentúry na územı́ kraj́ın Vǐsegrádskej
skupiny majú výrazný vplyv na export. Rôzne inštitucionálne formy exportných
úverových agentúr sú v predkladanej práci porovnané. S použit́ım pŕıkladu
Českej republiky, ako malej a otvorenej ekonomiky, je navrhnuté, že najvýhodneǰsou
a najefekt́ıvneǰsou stratégiou pre vlády v porovnatělných krajinách je založenie
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Master Thesis Proposal
Author Bc. Lucia Pšenáková
Supervisor prof. Ing. Karel Janda M.A., Dr., Ph. D
Proposed topic The Performance of Export Credit Agencies in European
Post-Communist Countries
Topic characteristics Government in each Visegrad Four country developed
a strategy to boost its export to help its country to recover from the current
financial crisis. In particular, they want to further support their domestic
exporters through subsidized credits, loans, insurance schemes or consulting.
However, there is no complex, extensive and independent analysis of effective-
ness and precise impact of such government policy applied on very specific and
homogenous region of post-transitive European economies. The goal of this
master thesis is to analyze performance of ECAs in the Visegrad Four region
during the last two decades. We will use two different approaches.
The first approach uses gravity equation of international trade; all previ-
ously obtained results will be highly improved. The second approach consists
of creation of a unique database for each firm in at least one of the countries
including firm-level data about each exporting firm. This will be extremely
challenging due to the huge amount of detailed data we are going to collect
from different sources, such as information about types of products and their
quantity for each firm separately, exporting destinations (from customs offices),
precise characteristics of a respective firm (from tax department) and informa-
tion about firm’s participation in official export promotion scheme. We have
to match data from 3 different datasets for each firm. With this dataset we are
going to be able to not only evaluate an impact of such government policy on
macroeconomic indicators of export, but we could also characterize a change
of company’s output (portfolio of products or exporting destinations) and find
Master Thesis Proposal x
a strategy for export agencies when choosing their future, most profitable, in-
vestment.
Hypotheses
1. Which form of ECA (e.g. bank, insurance company, or a combination of
the two) is the most effective?
2. Does government investment into ECA pay off?
3. Does an access to state export promotion have a large impact on a typical
firm in the region?
Methodology In the first part of the master thesis, we are going to use pre-
viously collected data from Eximbanka, KUKE and CEB and include missing
data from Hungarian Eximbank and EGAP. Afterwards, we are going to use
gravity model approach in order to obtain more precise results and significantly
improve empirical models of effectiveness of export promotion for Visegrad Four
region.
Second part of this master thesis is going to be focused on rather microe-
conomic effect of government export promotion. We have to create a unique
dataset containing an amount of government export assistance provided by
ECA to a firm, characteristics of a firm (annual earnings, number of employ-
ees, etc.) and an amount of export from a firm. One way how to proceed;
suggested in Martincus (2008); is to use a so-called matching difference-in-
difference model. Matching part consists of pairing each assisted firm with
more similar members of the non-assisted group on the basis of their observ-
able characteristics and then estimating the impact of assistance by comparing
the exports of matched assisted and nonassisted firms.
Outline The expected structure of the master thesis is as follows:
1. Introduction
2. Development of ECA in the region
3. Description of data and methodology
Master Thesis Proposal xi
4. Results
5. Verification of hyphotesis
6. Conclusion
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All OECD countries, with an exception of Ireland and Iceland, set up a sep-
arate institution to publicly promote exports from their countries - so called
export credit agency. Export credit agencies are commonly structured as public
or semi-public institutions that draw funds from the treasury or public capital
markets and transform these into export finance. Some ECAs are organized
as government departments that report to particular ministries (e.g. ECGD in
the UK and ERG in Switzerland), some are structured as more autonomous
state-owned enterprises (e.g. SACE in Italy and NEXI in Japan), whereas in a
few cases, official export credits are channelled through a private company on
the basis of an agreement with the host government (e.g. COFACE in France
and Hermes in Germany) (Wright, 2011).
This thesis focuses on export credit agencies incorporated on the territory
of Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary). Even
though all four countries represent relatively homogenous group of small, de-
veloped and opened economies that overcame the period of transition, their
export promotion schemes differ significantly.
The structure of this thesis is following. The first chapter reviews current
trends in literature regarding the analysis of export credit agencies. The second
chapter contains theoretical insides and backround preceding empirical analy-
sis of export credit agencies. Reasons for establishment of such institution and
conditions to be fullfilled before an establishment of export credit agency are
introduced. Development of international trade with regards to expansion of
export promotion activites and successful performance of export credit agen-
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cies during the recent financial crisis are described. All export credit agencies
on the territory of Visegrad Four countries are presented and a comparison
of portfolio of products they offer follow. The third chapter uses an example
of export credit agencies in the Czech Republic and traditional econometric
approach based on gravity equation of international trade to test and compare
effectiveness of two institutional forms of such agencies (institution offering in-
surance product and institution offering bank products). The fourth chapter
uses an extensive dataset created for the purposes of this thesis to analyse five
export credit agencies on the territory of Visegrad Four throughout almost all
years of operation of those agencies. Competitiveness and performance of the
five agencies is estimated using multiple econometric techniques until proper
specification of the model. A summary of findings and further suggestions for
the analysis of export credit agencies (hereinunder: ECAs) in the region are
carried in the last chapter.
Chapter 2
Review of Literature
This section shortly presents recent academic literature analysing the impact of
export credit agencies, their methodology and results. The topic of government
export promotion remains a controversial issue among academic economists,
business analysts and policy makers. Active export promotion policy support-
ers argue that independant official export promotion agency strengthtens the
export promotion of domestic companies. Multiple research papers empirically
support this position. Abraham and Dewit (2000) showed that export promo-
tion does not necessarilly imply trade distortions and that the most export des-
tination do not benefit from insurance premium subsidies. The article focuses
on official export insurance. Other benefit is that their insurance stimulates
trade by covering commercial, and more importantly political risks. Export
guarantees reduce the profit uncertainity of risk-averse exporters and decrease
default risk of importer’s. Volume of exports to risky markets therefore in-
crease. Majority of working papers that followed Abrahan and Dewit (2000)
conclude positive, although small effect of official export promotion institutions
on volume of export.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) introduced a new methodological ap-
proach that can be widely applied to different aspects of implicit barriers of
international trade. Data from the United States were observed and it was con-
cluded that borders reduce bilateral national trade level by plausible though
substantial magnitudes. The new methodology is suggested to estimate effects
of other variables, such as currency unions, or in our case, an establishment of
export credit agency in a country. As a result, two influencial and traditional
approaches to estimation of impact of ECAs were introduced by Egger and Url
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(2006) and Moser et al. (2008), other relevant literature builds on their work.
Egger and Url (2006) applied gravity model of international trade on data
from Austrian export credit agency, Oesterreichische Kontrollbank. They used
newly granted guarantees for the period 1996 - 2002 disagregated on two-digit
industry level. It was concluded that there is a large difference between short-
term and long-term effects of public export guarantees on export flows due to
the lag between the day when guarantee is provided and the actual shipment
of the good that creates a time shift between ECA book-keeping and official
foreign trade statistics. Austrian export credit guarantees push exports mainly
into Central, Eastern and Southern European countries, as well as other formet
Soviet Union countries. Export credit guarantees change the industry special-
isation only to a small extent (around 23%).
Moser et al. (2008) examined positive effect of export guarantees of ECA
Euler Hermes on volume of exports from Germany. The gravity model empirical
approach was used; a new variable, political risk, was introduced. No signifi-
cant effect of export guarantees was observed on the sample of non-industrial
countries alone was observed. After the change of legislation, guarantees led
to more than proportional increase of exports with multiplier around 1.11 even
for the group of non-industrial countries. Political risk was found to have a
detrimental effect on exports. It was pointed out that costs of public export
intervention and market distortion must be considered when evaluating ECAs
(Euler Hermes experienced significant losses in 1980s and beggining of 1990s
that had to be covered from the state budget).
Recent influential paper by applies Euler Hermes data for the time period
2000-2009. Unlike previous authors that used aggregate data, the Felbermayr
and Yalcin (2013) use two-digit industry level data, hence sector effects were
accounted for. They did not estimate dynamic gravity equation, but rather
canonical theory-founded model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) that
estimates impact of export credit guarantees on the intensive margin of bilat-
eral trade by using a linear model with a complete set of binary fixed-effect
interactions while controlling for multilateral resistance terms. The estimated
effect of export guarantees is significantly smaller than in previous literature,
especially in richer countries where there is little need for public guarantees.
The effect is larger in sectors characterised by high time-to-build lags and ex-
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ternal financial dependance, such as aviation, shipbuilding and transportation.
Similar approach with firm-level data had been used by Volpe and Carballo
(2010). They applied matching difference-in-difference approach on firm-level
data from small developing country, Uruguay. They examined the effect of
official public policies (e.g. export credit agencies) on decision to enter new
export markets. They found out that trade supporting activities have helped
firms reach new destination countries and introduce new differentiated prod-
ucts, although trade promotion activities do not effect the volume of exports.
Further, Badinger and Url (2013) estimated effect of Austrian export guaran-
tees on firm-level data on sample of 178 firms. Data were obtained by survey
as responses to a questionnaire. Determinants of firm’s export guarantee usage
are assesed. They found a sizeable, economically and statistically significant
effect of export credit guarantees on extra-firm exports.
Vast majority of world academic literature focuses only on export guaran-
tees, empirical analysis of ECAs providing credits and other bank products is
therefore given by Janda et al. (2013a). They analysed gravity equation for the
Czech Republic in 1996 - 2008 period on data from Czech Export Bank. While
Czech exports flow mainly to European developed countries, export guarantees
push Czech exports to mostly European developing countries. Unlike previous
methods of estimation of the gravity equation, Least Trimmed Squared ap-
proach is used to find influantial data in the sample; assumption of the equal
importance of all observations is relaxed. Two gravity models were proposed
and the results were ambiguous. In the static model, guarantees are highly sig-
nificant factor affecting exports, dynamic model does not provide any explicit
evidence whether export promotion in form of guarantees is successful. After
the removal of outliers, the hypothesis of successfulnes of export guarantees can
not be rejected. Guarantees reduce uncertainty and hence increase exports to
(risky) countries. ECAs moreover reduce entry costs and gather information
of foreign markets.
Janda et al. (2013b) analysed ECAs in Visegrad Four region that form
very homogenous group, nevertheless, their export promotion schemes differ.
Different forms of ECAs are described and evaluated. Gravity model is applied
on data from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland and it is concluded that
ECA operating the most effectively is currently Polish KUKE that operates
as an insurance institution for Polish exporters. Gravity equation of interna-
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tional trade was estimated by fixed effect method and least squared dummy
variable (LSDV) method. This thesis builts on this working paper and extends
obtained findings by expanding the dataset and using more appropriate econo-
metric techniques.
Nevertheless, oponents of export credit agencies argue that objectives of ex-
port promotions are likely to be captured by powerfull interest groups. Export
promotion might distort competition and undermine multilateral free trade sys-
tem. Public credit insurance can be also used to hide export subsidies in case
the insurance premium charged by ECA is below the premium level that exactly
covers the sum of expected losses and transaction costs of the insurer. Export
subsidy consists of this difference. Higher optimal output of the exporter leads
to a market distortion (Egger and Url, 2006). For those reasons, free traders
(opponents of official ECAs) support efforts of World Trade Organisation and
the European Union to regulate export subsidies (Abraham and Dewit, 2000).
OECD Consensus Agreement harmonizes public export insurance in industrial
countries and decreases market distortions. Meanwhile Chauffour et al. (2010)
discuse conditions to be fullfilled in a country in order to effectively set up
an ECA. Emerging markets have been affected by the lack of available trade
financing options. Strong government structure must be involved as well as
sufficiently large capital stock for the institution to be capable of acting in-
dependently and to have strong enough operational footprint to achieve its
objectives must be available. Authors conclude that ECAs are more suitable
for more matured economies than for low-income countries that are still con-
fronting development challenges.
Chapter 3
Institutional Backround to ECA
Analysis
This chapter is divided into six sections. Theoretical aspects preceding empir-
ical analysis of government-backed export credit agencies are discussed. First
section summarizes reasons for establishing ECAs and for public support of
ECAs. The second section describes international regulation of ECAs. In-
centives for such regulation are introduced. The third section describes and
compares different institutional forms of ECAs established in Visegrad Four
countries and analyses advantages of each form. Development of international
trade regarding performance of ECAs in the region is covered in the next sec-
tion. Section analysing performance of ECAs during the recent financial crisis
and emphasising importance of ECAs in times of the crisis follows. The last
section contains information about different product portfolios offered by ECAs
that exporters, banks or buyers of exports can benefit from.
3.1 Incentives for Public Export Promotion
Export transactions tend to be larger, they consist of capital intensive goods,
whose production and delivery might take several months or even years, there-
fore delivery periods are substiantly longer and transactions become more risky
(Herger and Lobsiger, 2010). Longer distance to the export destination causes
larger cost of shipment, hence cost of produced yet not delivered products also
increases. Various financial instruments have emerged as substitutes for the
lack of face-to-face cash transactions between suppliers and customers in inter-
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national trade as a result of rare cash payments in international transactions
(Badinger and Url, 2013).
It is common that domestic firms within their countries provide cash dis-
counts as an incentive for early payment.1 Average maturity of the credit on
invoice for firms within one country is 60 to 80 days. In international trade, the
length of the credit is significantly longer. For a comparison, payment within
first three months after the issue of the credit signals a high creditworthiness
of the consumer. Payments of exports of equipments or machinery might be
often extended to up to five years (Egger and Url, 2006). Delay in transac-
tions exposes firms to a risk of default. Debt instruments, such as trade credit,
permit firms to finance such delays in transactions without imposing internal
funds (Baltensperger and Herger, 2009). Exporters and their banks, however,
generally have less resources to cover credit defaults for international transac-
tions (Felbermayr and Yalcin, 2013).
Catastrophic events, such as political unrest or economic crisis can lead
to high losses for exporters. Incomplete information about creditworthiness of
foreign buyers, exchange rate fluctuations, or even the hazard involved in inter-
national contracts, increase the risk that exporters face in cross-border trade.
Monitoring costs for the international trade further increase due to different
jurisdictions (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011), especially enforcing repayment of
the contract in a foreign jurisdiction is complicated (Badinger and Url, 2013)
hence decreased chances of repayment of the credit. Financial frictions have
significantly stronger effect on international transactions than domestic ones
(Amiti and Weinstein, 2011). International trade increases bank counterparty
risk and systematic risk (Chauffour et al., 2010). As a result, insurance of large
exports towards politically unstable countries is widely non-marketable (Herger
and Lobsiger, 2010). Therefore ECAs, insuring exports on government’s behalf,
have been established in OECD countries. Credit insurance in advance limits
potential losses from export sales on credit to a previously agreed fixed insured
amount (Baltensperger and Herger, 2009). This has a particularly important
issue after the start of the recent financial crisis when a need for export guar-
antees increased (Felbermayr and Yalcin, 2013).
1For example, if a costumer pays within first ten days, amount of three percent is deducted
from his invoice total, while the payment is due in thirty days.
3. Institutional Backround to ECA Analysis 9
Demand for export insurance and guarantees is high. The market for short-
term insurance is dominated by private agencies (over 80% of overall business)
and ECAs underwrite the wider majority of medium and long-term commit-
ments by providing adequate insurance to domestic exporters. The latter are
evaluated as more risky and hence not applicable for commercial forms of insur-
ance and exports might not be realized without any form of publicly provided
insurance. Medium and long-term insurance is usually used for larger trans-
actions, such as those related to capital goods, large machinery or turn-key
plants. Exporters insure themselves directly against the risk of buyer’s default
and the exporters are reimbursed in case of non-payment. Credit guarantees
are widely used; they provide guarantees to banks or other financial institutions
willing to lend either to the exporting or the importing firm. If the primary
reliable firm fails to repay the credit, the guarantor takes a responsability for
the financial obligation (Chauffour et al., 2010).
3.2 International Regulation of ECAs
First attempt to regulate ECAs was a foundation of the Berne Union, estab-
lished by France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom in 1934. Initial goal
of the organisation was to facilitate cross-border trade by supporting interna-
tional acceptance of principles in export credits and foreign investment and to
provide a forum for professional exchanges among their members (Psenakova,
2012). Actions to regulate government-backed ECAs intensified in 1950s due to
ambiguous effect of their operations on trade competitors (Evans, 2005) and in
order to prevent a recurence of the war of export subsidies which had erupted
earlier in the 1970s (Wright, 2011) when the four-fold increase in oil prices
occured resulting in some countries attracting significant trade deficits and at-
tempting to limit these through the provision of extremely advantageous credit
terms (Mulligan, 2007). The signature of OECD Arrangement on Officially
Supported Export Credits followed in 1975. According to the OECD Arrange-
ment, ECAs can have forms of either ministerial department, publicly owned
or supported insurance companies (Baltensperger and Herger, 2009). Despite
the limited membership of OECD Arrangement (only 22 countries) and rather
being a self-designed gentlemen’s than formal agreement (Wright, 2011), the
OECD Arrangement has the most influential role in enforcing rules (Ray, 1998).
The OECD Arrangement moreover provides a framework for OECD countries
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to negotiate how to stabilize the delicate conflict between the concentrated
national benefits of promoting domestic exports and the diffused international
costs that they may impose on each other. The overarching aim has not been
to eliminate export subsidies altogether, but to establish an international con-
sensus on what constitutes a legitimate export subsidy (Wright, 2011).
The main changes in the OECD Arrangement in 2005 were primarily related
to interest rates, mixed/tied credits and local cost support. Changes have also
been made to the classification of countries, the inclusion of certain types of
ships, nuclear power stations and commercial aircraft. Renewable energy and
water projects were fully excluded in 1978 but reviewed in June 2007 (Mulli-
gan, 2007).
Nowadays, the Berne Union (or the International Union of Credit and In-
vestment Insurers) is the leading association for export credit and investment
insurance worldwide, and is providing a forum for professional exchange among
its members. 70 ECAs from around the world are current members of the Berne
Union, including all ECAs on the territory of Visegrad Four region. Berne
Union’s members represent all aspects (private and public) of the export credit
and investment insurance industry worldwide. The organization regularly asks
its members to provide information about their provision of short as well as
medium and long-term export insurance to trading partners around the globe
(Chauffour and Farole, 2009). To help support roles of the Berne Union, the
Prague Club was established in 1994. Its primary objectives were to form in-
formation exchange networks in Central and Eastern Europe (Asia and Africa
later joined) for agencies that did not yet meet the entrance requirements of
the Berne Union and to support such agencies in developing their export credit
and insurance schemes (Mulligan, 2007). There are 33 current members of the
Prague Club. Even though all ECAs in Visegrad Four fullfilled the criteria
for the Berne Union membership, they remain members of the Prague Club
(Psenakova, 2012).
3.3 Export Credit Agencies in Visegrad Four
States govern their official export promotion schemes through either direct or
indirect ownership of respective export credit agencies. Indirect ownership
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might be managed via banks of national economy (Poland), state-owned de-
velopment banks (Hungary, until recent bill passed in 2012) or another type of
ECA (Czech EGAP holds a minor percentage of shares of CEB).
First export credit agency on the territory of Visegrad Four was Polish Ex-
port Credit Insurance Corporation (hereinunder: KUKE), established in 1991.
Shortly after, the Export Guarantee Ltd. in Hungary and the Export Guar-
antee and Insurance Corporation (hereinunder: EGAP) incorporated in 1992,
and Export Credit Insurance Corporation in Slovakia incorporated in 1993. To
avoid problems emerged from combining export insurance and financing under
one organisation, first Hungarian ECA, the Export Guarantee Ltd., was divided
into two separate organisations in 1994 - the Hungarian Export Credit Insur-
ance (hereinunder: MEHIB) and the Hungarian Export-Import Bank (herein-
under: Eximbank). As EGAP provides only insurance coverage, an increased
need for state-owned credit agency promoting export was resolved in 1995 when
the Czech Export Bank (hereinuder: CEB) was established. Furthermore, Slo-
vak Export Credit Insurance Corporation was substituted by a typical ECA -
Eximbanka SR in 1997.
It is typical for European countries to have a separate institution providing
credits and guarantees, hence an institution operating in a form of a bank; and
an insurance company providing different types of export insurance, usually
with state guarantees. Another possibility is to have one institution offering
both insurance and bank products. All three models of ECAs have their advan-
tages and disadvantages that we are going to analyse in the following chapter.
Individual Government Bank
It is the most common model in the European Union. According to Janda et
al. (2013b), its advantages overcome its disadvantages because since it is in-
corporated as a joint-stock company, it is usually able to gain its own revenues.
This implies significantly lower public expenses for the government. Since the
government is usually its only shareholder, government has a big impact on the
portfolio of credits that the bank provides, and thus, the government can also
choose priority territories to promote. On the other side, it can not operate
just by itself and it has to insure a vast majority of its credits in another in-
surance company. This may be prevented by introducing a special government
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legislation for eximbanks.
This institutional form is used in the Czech Republic (Czech Export Bank)
and Hungary (Export-Import Bank).
Individual Insurance Company
The second model, usually connected with the model of the individual state
export bank, is an individual insurance company. According to Janda et al.
(2013b), similarly to the individual export bank, there is a possibility of long-
term operations on its own budget and revenues when the insurance company
is incorporated as a joint-stock company. Then direct risk for the government
decreases and so there is no need for accounting of direct government guar-
antees in a national budget. By analogy, the individual insurance company is
necessarily reliable on commercial banks’ financing. Its disadvantage is that
the government can not influence territorial targets of the insurance company.
To do so, the government export bank must be employed.
This type of institution is the most commonly used in Visegrad countries,
it was established in Poland (KUKE), in the Czech Republic (EGAP) and in
Hungary (MEHIB).
While all other ECAs in the region provide only insurance to otherwise
non-insurable exports by commercial insurance companies, MEHIB provides
two types of insurance. Typical political risk insurance is protected by the
state guarantees (same model applies in EGAP and KUKE), MEHIB is enti-
tled to insure commercial marketable risk for which it is fully responsible.
Target markets differ for the three ECAs. MEHIB is highly oriented to-
wards Russian (65% of its non-marketable insurance activities in 2010) and
other post-Soviet markets, KUKE and EGAP orient more towards developed
European countries with close geographical and political relations (e.g. Ger-
many and Netherlands).
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Institution Offering Both Insurance and Banking Products
The last type of the institutional form of export credit agencies is an institu-
tion offering both insurance and banking products. According to Janda et al.
(2013b), its disadvantages, derived from the previous discussion, are that this
institution can not use only its own financing to operate. Furthermore, it is
quite difficult to define this institution: Is it a bank or is it an insurance com-
pany? This also implies that it is not possible for this type of ECA to obtain
its own rating, therefore it has to face an extensive risk. At the same time, a
special laws must be adopted for this institution to operate as a separate joint-
stock company (such as Act No. 80/1997 Coll. on the Export-Import bank in
Slovak Republic). Commercial banks might not be willing to provide financing
that is sometimes necessary. On the other side, this type of an institution has a
wider range of products offered in one place and its costumers can benefit from
its one stop shop approach. This institution can also use its own “know-how”
and support.
The only representative of this form is Slovak Eximbanka. It is necessary
to mention that this export support scheme has also employed in Hungary
until 1994, when the Export Guarantee Ltd. was divided into two separated
organizations, above mentioned MEHIB and Export-Import bank.
3.4 International Trade and Export Promotion De-
velopment in Visegrad Four
In this section we observe evolution of exports (from the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Poland and Hungary) and export promotion in form of insurance (in the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland). Exports to above 180 are traced in 1994
- 2012 period and they are summarized in Table 3.2. The numbers are reported
in billions of USD. Countries are grouped according to Human Development
Index. The Human Development Index 2012 (HDI) is a composite statistic of
life expectancy, education, and income indices used to rank countries into four
equal size tiers of human development. For the list of analysed countries, by
the category, see Table 3.1. Category 1 includes industrial, highly developed
countries, category 4 contains the least developed countries.
For a better comparison, Figure 3.1 provides graphic distribution of share
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Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barba-
dos, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hongkong, Hungary, Chile,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep.,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portu-
gal, Qatar, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom, United States
Category 2:
developed
Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
The, Bahrain, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Ecuador, Georgia, Grenada, Iran, Jamaica,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Oman,
Panama, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sri
Lanka, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,




Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Cambodia, Do-
minican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana,
Honduras, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kyr-
gyz Republic, Lao PDR, Maldives, Moldova, Mongo-
lia, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philip-
pines, Samoa, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-




Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Demo-
cratic Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gambia, The, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Chad, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Repub-
lic of Congo, Republic of Yemen, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zam-
bia, Zimbabwe
Source: HDI
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Table 3.2: Export outflows by country development index (in billions
USD)
1 2 3 4 TOTAL
Czech Republic
1994 11974 652 538 52 13215
1997 19942 894 405 52 21294
2000 26854 1162 391 53 28459
2003 45277 1750 652 58 47738
2006 84965 4675 1590 226 91456
2009 98937 5748 2647 320 107652
2012 135714 9681 4043 369 149808
Slovakia
1994 5722 344 225 20 6311
1997 8384 527 119 18 9048
2000 11108 429 158 24 11719
2003 17640 855 238 16 18748
2006 32006 2379 517 83 34985
2009 29948 3754 1207 99 35008
2012 67439 5077 2226 109 74852
Poland
1994 13638 935 442 102 15116
1997 19720 2291 621 118 22749
2000 27386 1887 461 176 29910
2003 44283 3668 721 172 48843
2006 85946 10052 2099 301 98399
2009 107554 11311 3355 558 122778
2012 66195 18221 4670 686 89773
Hungary
1994 42168 4167 995 220 47549
1997 15657 1077 202 45 16980
2000 25118 1574 230 27 26949
2003 37078 2746 546 79 40449
2006 55010 8350 1848 449 65657
2009 60003 9861 2260 109 72233
2012 75974 14788 3635 374 94771
Source: Comtrade, HDI, author’s calculation
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of overall export ouflows in percents into each observed category of countries.
Share of exports to highly developed countries highly exceeds exports to other
group of countries, its share ranges from 73% (Poland, 2012) to almost 95%
(the Czech Republic, 2003), whereas share of exports to the least developed
countries does not exceed 0.6% (Poland, 2003). Distribution of exports from
all four countries follows similar, stable pattern. Share of exports to countries
with middle development index (category 2 and 3) starts to increase after year
2006 and peaks in 2012, when exports from Poland to countries of category 2
and 3 account for up to 25.5%. Overally, exports are significantly more diver-
sified in recent years than in the beginning of the observed period.
Figure 3.1: Export outflows by country development index in %
Table 3.3 reports distribution of export insurance coverage to the same cat-
egories of countries. Data are available for years 1994 - 2012 for Slovakia and
for the Czech Republic and for years 2003 - 2009 for Poland.
Analogically, a percentage share of export insurance by Visegrad ECAs
into four categories of countries, according to their level of development, is
summarized in Figure 3.2. While a similar pattern of the share of exports was
observed in all four countries, distribution of insurance coverage of exports is
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Table 3.3: Export insurance coverage by country development index
(in billion USD)
1 2 3 4 TOTAL
Czech Republic
1994 5.3 156.8 38.1 0.0 200.3
1997 128.7 163.7 170.7 2.2 465.3
2000 300.2 433.2 29.9 0.7 763.9
2003 191.4 149.5 69.4 0.0 410.4
2006 193.5 472.0 153.3 68.0 886.9
2009 1222.3 581.2 167.0 5.3 1975.7
2012 405.8 1522.8 599.6 6.5 2534.7
Slovakia
1994 15.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 16.1
1997 32.3 6.4 8.6 0.0 47.3
2000 121.2 15.1 15.5 0.0 151.9
2003 271.7 84.9 4.3 0.2 361.1
2006 543.7 192.3 0.9 0.0 737.0
2009 512.0 131.2 47.4 0.0 690.7
2012 766.6 119.8 14.4 1.6 902.4
Poland
2003 1097.5 283.5 27.7 0.1 1408.8
2006 1302.8 429.7 22.1 0.0 1754.5
2009 1244.7 432.5 44.9 0.3 1722.5
Source: Comtrade, HDI, author’s calculation
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clearly more volatile and differ markedly even among the three countries. Un-
like exports, export insurance provided by ECAs is designated, by definition,
for more risky countries that often tend to be less developed. Slovak and Polish
ECAs, however, insure exports targeting mostly to highly developed countries
(around 70%). Czech insurance of exports to highly developed countries ranges
from 3% in the initial year to 62% in 2009, meanwhile insurance of exports of
category 2 countries dominates. There was a substantial jump in the distri-
bution of the insurance recorded after the offset of the financial crisis in 2009,
although with different sign effects in the three countries. Czech export in-
surance share designated for the developed countries decreased from 42% in
2008 to 16% in 2011, opposite effect occured in Slovakia (from 70% share in
2008 up to 81% in 2011) and Poland (from 68% share in 2008 up to 77% in
2011). Similar categorization of countries into four categories according to their
income (published by the World Bank) is used in Felbermayr and Yalcin (2013).
Figure 3.2: Export insurance by country development index in %
Official export insurance promotion provided by ECAs covers volume of ex-
port only to a small extent. Slovak insurance coverage is the lowest, starting at
0.3% in 1993 (i.e. Slovak Eximbanka insured 0.3% of all Slovak exports) and
it peaks at 2.8% in 2002 and afterwards slightly decreases. Czech insurance
coverage ranges from 0.6% in 1993 to 2.8% in 1999. Polish ECA KUKE insures
relatively the highest percentage of Polish exports, ranging between 1.4% and
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3.3%.
3.5 Importance of ECAs during the Financial Cri-
sis
Publicly supported export credit and insurance schemes are primarly estab-
lished to correct failures that arise with non-marketable parts of trade finance
in the international trade sector. Thus a desire for creating and strenghtening
ECAs in the time of crisis increases. Financial crisis has a negative and size-
able impact on export (Monova et al., 2011). Therefore at the G20 summit in
London in 2009, governments pledged to support international trade flows by
providing their respective ECAs with expanded mandates to issue short-term
direct financing to exporters (Wright, 2011), hence their ECAs are bound to
provide at least 250 billion USD of additional guarantees to mitigate against
the decrease in the international trade due to the current crisis (Herger and
Lobsiger, 2010).
Uncertainity, due to higher problems of assymetric information, increases
when the financial crisis occurs. Decline of exports is as well caused by financial
constraints. International trade frequently relies on financial intermediaries,
because sellers do not frequently extend credit to foreign buyers directly, in-
stead, they leave the lending to a domestic bank, who in turn contracts with
the buyer’s bank. As an implication, imports to countries with less trust in the
buyer’s bank are hit relatively harder by the financial crisis. Since trade finance
has a critical role in supporting international trade (around 80-90% of world
international trade relies on trade finance), the shortage of trade finance has
important negative consequences on international trade. This is where ECAs
step in. Empirical studies showed that public support for trade finance is more
effective than other forms of credit support (Ellingson and Vlachos, 2009).
When the crisis occurs, firms have incentives to hoard cash (Ellingson and
Vlachos, 2009). For example, US bank reserves massively increased; reserves
went up from 2 billion USD in Auguest 2008 to 798 billion USD in January
2009 (Edlin and Jaffe, 2009). As a solution, it was observed that banks often
tie the extention of credit to actual transactions, hence firms can not hoard
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cash. Moreover, sellers tend to insist on upfront payment from foreigners who
do often need credit. The bank in exporter’s domestic country is more willing
to provide specific loans for input purchases than general cash loans. Therefore,
incentives for promoting trade finance are stronger.
Theoretical importance of ECAs in times of the crisis is supported by nu-
merous empirical research studies. The effect of insured trade credit provided
by the Berne Union members on trade is very strong and remains stable over
the cycle and does not vary between crisis and noncrisis periods (Auboin and
Engemann, 2012). Data from private insurers suggest that considering a de-
cline in the supply of private credit insurance during the initial years of the
financial crisis, the reduction in private insurance exposure explains about 5 to
9% of the drop in world exports and even 10 to 20% of the drop in European
exports (Van der Veer, 2010).
Chauffour et al. (2010) traced the development of world imports and trade
insurance volumes from Q1 2005 to Q3 2009. Figure 3.3 summarizes their
findings. Trade volumes dropped between Q2 2008 and Q1 2009 and gradu-
ally recovered afterwards. Insurance volumes mirror the development of trade
volumes but insurance dropped by 15% less than the overall trade. When
separating between short-term and long-term insurance, figures suggest that
short-term insurance dropped strongly between Q2 2008 and Q1 2009 (22%)
unlike long-term commitments that dropped only by 3% and recovered steadily
ever since (9% increase was reported already in Q1 2009). Those findings are
supported by data from the Berne Union that indicate that in Q4 2008, new
insurance commitments of ECAs increased strongly for high-income countries
and decreased for developing countries (Chauffour and Farole, 2009).
This fact is explained by the increase of high systematic risk in the observed
period that is generally linked to an increase of large scale transactions. This
type of transactions tend to be covered by medium and long-term insurance.
Short-term commitments are terminated or reduced easily by banks or insurers
with needs to recapitalize and their balance sheets from liabilities with higher
risk. ECAs (covering mostly medium and long-term commitments) stepped in
to ease finance terms and to boost financial programs of governments (Chauf-
four et al., 2010).
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Source: Chauffour et al., 2010
Figure 3.3: World trade and trade insurance volumes
Chauffour et al. (2010) further decomposed changes of commitments in
2008 - 2009 time period into three categories depending on the level of income
of importing country. Drop of short-term commitments was evenly distributed
across three categories of countries. Recovery was slightly slower in middle-
income countries. The change of medium and long-term commitments (the case
of ECAs) was less evenly distributed. Between Q2 2008 and Q1 2009, medium
and long-term commitments grew by 9% to high-income importing countries
but dropped by 7% to middle-income and 4% to low-income countries. This
implies that crucial imports of raw materials and intermediate good to devel-
oping countries in the peak time of the crisis were not successful. After Q1
2009 (recovery period), medium and long-term commitments have rebounded
strongly for low and middle-income countries (by 12%) and remained constant
for high-income countries. Therefore ECAs have been more successful in sup-
porting trade flows to developing countries in the recovery period.
Annual data from three Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Poland) with exports and insurance volume to observed group of countries2
provide similar evidence. Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 indicate graphic develop-
ment. Export from all three countries was growing steadily in years 2005 -
2008 by 17% to 34% annually. Slovak export in 2008 was an exception, be-
cause its growth slowed down markedly (only 2% annual change). Sharp drop
of exports occured in 2009. Exports from the Czech Republic dropped by 22%,
from Poland and Slovakia by 21% annually, hence similar impact of the begin-
2For detailed description of dataset see Section 4.2.
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Figure 3.4: Export and promotion from the Czech Republic in 2005 -
2011 (in billions of USD)
ning of the crisis on all three countries is noticed.
Figure 3.5: Export and promotion from Poland in 2005 - 2011 (in
billions of USD)
After year 2009, development of exports differ in the three countries. Ex-
ports from the Czech Republic and Poland grew by around 16% in following
year, export from Slovakia increased more sharply. Growth continued in the
next year. Exports more than doubled in all three countries in the observed
period, 112% of additional volume of exports was added to observed volume of
initial export in the Czech Republic, by 102% in Poland and 148% in Slovakia.
We conclude that the three countries had very similar development of their
exports before the crisis, however, their exports were differently impacted by
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the financial crisis.
Figure 3.6: Export and promotion from Slovakia in 2005 - 2011 (in
billions of USD)
Development of amount of export promotion in the form of insurance in all
three countries mirrors the development of exports, with the exception of the
Czech Republic. Czech insurance volumes did not experience drop until 2011.
Before year 2009, insurance volumes were closely linked to export volumes.
Both Slovak and Polish insurance volumes dropped by 33% in 2009 in com-
parison with insurance volumes recored in the previous year. Polish insurance
volumes picked up much faster than in case of Slovakia in the next year, Czech
insurance volumes continued to grow only steadily.
We aggregated the data from three countries to obtain one graph in Fig-
ure 3.7. Again, data before 2009 for both exports and insurance volumes follow
a similar path, afterwards, drop is observed. Nevertheless, drop in overall insur-
ance volumes is much smaller than drop of exports (-10% and -22%). Insurance
volumes recovered in the next year and increased by even 31%. Growth of ex-
ports was slower (20%). This fact supports evidence that exports and insurance
volumes in three of the Visegrad countries follow worldwide trends in interna-
tional trade, presented by Chauffour et al. (2010). Visegrad ECAs boost the
trade after the outbreak of the crisis in 2009 and helped domestic exporters.
In order to compare similarities in findings of the analysis to Chauffour et al.
(2010), Figure3.8, with identical scale, follows. Lower volume of insurance in
Visegrad countries is due to the fact, that only one insurance company in each
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Figure 3.7: Total export and promotion in 2005 - 2011 (in billions of
USD)
country is accounted for, not all medium and long-term commitments are con-
tained in this analysis, as in case of Chauffour et al. (2010). Otherwise, our
findings are clearly similar and support the previous analysis.
Figure 3.8: Total export and promotion in 2005 - 2011 (in billions of
USD)
We conclude that ECAs intensively expanded their financial operations dur-
ing the recent financial crisis and they significantly helped to prevent financial
markets from drying up.
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3.6 Products of ECAs
First we present credit instruments used in Visegrad countries. Credit and
banking instruments are arranged according to categories of potential cus-
tomers that might benefit from products.
Direct export credit is provided to domestic exporters by ECA. Refinancing
contract with ECA can be signed after an issuance of credit with commercial
financial institution. Afterwards, refinancing enables exporter’s bank to ob-
tain funds from ECA to provide credit for the exporter under more favourable
conditions. Domestic exporters can benefit from subsitied credits for their in-
vestment projects abroad. Among common bank guarantees issued by ECAs
are bid, performance, retention and warranty.
Structure of instruments for foreign buyers of exports from Visegrad Four
region is more complex, depending on the stage of business with the exporter.
Even before signing the contract, pre-export credit financing costs connected
to contract is available. Furthermore, direct and indirect export buyer cred-
its are extensively traded. The latter stands for an agreement signed between
the buyer’s bank and ECA. Refinancing of buyer’s export credit is also common.
ECAs’ insurance covers losses from defaulted supplier and buyer credits,
confiscation of goods abroad, claimed contract bonds and guarantees, or the
production costs of incomplete export transactions (pre-shipment insurance).
To offset reduction in exports due to the current crisis, some new insurance
products have recently been launched. Those include export risk guarantees
on working capital, letters of credit, and counter and refinancing guarantees
(Herger and Lobsiger, 2010).3
The most common trade credit insurance products are following (Herger
and Lobsiger, 2010). Letters of credit commits the importer’s bank itself to
pay the domestic exporter the agreed price once conditions like the punctual
and undamaged delivery of the products have been met. With a documentary
collection, exporter delegates the settlement of the payment to a bank which
handles the collection by sending corresponding instructions to the importer’s
bank. Those indirect payments have an advantage that they are made more
3In case of Swiss ECA - Swiss Export Risk Insurance.
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quickly and with expertise of specialized intermediary for financial transactions,
moreover, they rely on the creditworthiness of the foreign bank rather than on
unknown foreign buyer (Herger and Lobsiger, 2010).
The majority of insurance products from Visegrad ECAs is designed for ex-
porter’s commercial banks. Insurance of credit for pre-export financing covers
the bank against a non-repayment of the credit due to inability of exporter to
fulfill the contract or to manufacture goods or provide services. Bank can more-
over choose from insurance of short term or medium and long term supplier
credit financed by the bank. They protect against the risk of non-repayment
by a foreign importer. Bank possibly applies insurance of confirmed letter of
credit. This instrument is defined as a written promise of a seller to a buyer
that is guaranteed to clear by seller’s bank (in this case, by exporter’s bank).
As for the bank of importer of Visegrad goods or services, it might employ
insurance of export buyer credit instrument to cover the risk of non-repayment
of export buyer credit by a foreign importer. Characteristics of this type of in-
surance are highly standardized by the OECD Consensus (Janda et al., 2013b).
Future investors (or their banks) benefit from insurance of investments of
domestic legal persons abroad when investor is willing to enter target markets of
Visegrad governments. Exporter can apply insurance of short term or medium
and long term exporter supplier credit, depending on the lenght of the contract.
The widest portfolio of both insurance and financing products is offered by
the Czech Republic (22 different types of above mentioned insurance and credit
instruments are offered all together), followed by Slovakia (18), Hungary (13)
and Poland (10). A proximity of Czech and Slovak export product portfolio
could be observed; this might be explained by close historical ties and joint
development of banking and insurance sector (Janda et al., 2013b). For a table
summarizing the instruments used in Visegrad ECAs, see the Appendix B.
Direct export buyer credit forms the highest share of credit financing used
by ECA in the Czech Republic (77%) followed by pre-export financing cost
credit (20%). As EGAP’s most commnon partner bank is CEB (over 30% of
EGAP’s insurance covers CEB’s credits), the structure of EGAP’s insurance is
similar, with the highest share of insurance of direct export credit (55%) and
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pre-export costs (20%).4 Slovak Eximbanka’s widely used instruments are bank
guarantees (52%) and refinancing of export buyer credit (29%), with insurance
of export receivables consisting of 72% of all insurance products.5 Hungar-
ian Eximbank finances mostly export buyers credit and pre-export financing
credit.6
4Annual Reports of CEB and EGAP, 2012.
5Annual Report of Eximbanka SR, 2011.
6Annual Report of Eximbank, 2012.
Chapter 4
Analysis of ECAs in the Czech
Republic Based on Gravity
Equation of International Trade
This chapter analyses an effectiveness of advanced post-Communist European
countries using an example of the Czech Republic. Two forms of ECAs were
established shortly after a demise of Czechoslovakia. EGAP, state-owned credit
insurance institution, was established in June 1992 to cover political and com-
mercial risks uninsurable by commercial insurance. Establishment of the Czech
Export Bank followed in March 1995 to further support competitiveness of
Czech exports by providing goverment-backed financing for Czech exporters.
This chapter uses a unique dataset including historical data for all com-
plete years of operation of Czech ECAs until year 2012. This thesis is the
first to estimate effects of both separate export credit agencies in one country
and to compare their impact on exports. Both institutions are at first anal-
ysed separately, afterwards datasets were merged into a single dataset. We
test whether export promotion in form of both isurance coverage or credit cre-
ates additional Czech exports, whether gravity model of international trade is
supported by Czech data (we test significance of traditional variables used in
gravity models of international trade, e.g. GDP, population, distance) while
adding variables political risk and export promotion. First section describes
theoretical backround to international trade equation and specifies the method-
ology, description of data is included in the second section. Results and a short
discussion of empirical results follow.
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4.1 Theoretical Framework
In the literature, international trade flows have often been studied along the
lines of the gravity equation.1 In fact, the gravity model has become the main
working tool for an empirical analysis of international trade (Moser et al., 2008),
and it was used to estimate effects of eg. trade agreements or currency unions
on international trade flows. Gravity equation model proved to be highly con-
sistened with other macroeconomical models.
The basic idea of the model is related to physics due to the fact that grav-
itation attraction between two bodies (countries) depends positively on the
mass of each body (approximated by the size of economies measured by their
respective GDP) and negatively on the distance separating them (distance of
countries, approximated by the distance between their capiatal cities). Due to
the nature of public export promotion, they tend to alleviate friction of the in-
ternational trade and thus are expected to have positive impact on the volume
of international trade (exports). Despite export promotion being designated
mostly for exports to countries with higher political risk, it covers only a small
percentage of overall volume of exports. Thus we expect political risk to neg-
atively impact trade volumes, because exports are more likely to flow to safer
destinations with lower political risk.
4.2 Econometrical Model and Data Description
We estimate three different specifications of gravity model along the lines with
Egger and Url (2006) and Janda et al. (2013b). Our baseline equation has a
form:
1This methodology dates back to Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963), who first esti-
mated a gravity equation for trade flows.
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ln(exportit) = β0 + β1 ln(promotionit) + β2 ln(GDPit) +
+ β3 ln(distancei) + β4 ln(populationit) +
+ β5 ln(riskit) + µi + µt + εit
where t stands for a year, i stands for a receiving country destination, µi is a
country specific error term, µt is a time specific error term and εit stands for an
error term with zero mean and constant variance. Model describing the CEB
covers time period 1996 - 2012,2 whereas insurance company (EGAP) model
covers time period 1993 - 2012.3
An endogenous variable in our regression models is a logarithm of export
from observed country (the Czech Republic) to country i in year t. It is ex-
pressed in current US dollars. Data were collected from the Comtrade database
in USD.
A key variable in our model is ln(promotionit). It is a logarithm of overall
amount of state promotion sent into a country i in year t that was provided
by corresponding export credit agency (EGAP or CEB). It is a sum of differ-
ent forms of promotion: guarantees, credits, etc. in case of CEB and different
types of insurance coverage in case of EGAP. It is a variable of interest in our
regression model and we use its coefficient to compare effects of export credit
agencies in two different forms on an amount of export. Data were provided
by CEB and EGAP. We assume that state export promotion increases export
especially to countries with higher political risk. Hence we expect a positive
coefficient of the variable.4 Other exogenous explanatory variables are:
ln(GDPit) is a logarithm of GDP of a receiving country i in year t. This
variable is suggested to be used as a proxy for a size of market in gravity
2Data for the year 1995 do not cover the entire year 1995 hence they are excluded from
our analysis.
3Analogically we excluded year 2012.
4Note that a common practice when dealing with transformation of zero values to loga-
rthmical form is to remove those observations. However, in our case, there is a large number
of zero values and so we can not remove all of them. Thus when running the regression we
subsituted all zero values of promotion by 1 in order to be able to compute logarithmical
form. This approach has been suggested by Janda et al. (2013a).
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models. Data were obtained from the International Monetary Fund and
they are expressed in current USD. We expect a coefficient of this variable
to be positive because demand for imported products and services should
increase in bigger markets.
ln(distancet) is a logarithm of geographical distance of capital cities of ex-
porting and importing country i, expressed in kilometres. It is proposed
as a proxy for transaction costs and hence for resistance in the gravity
model. Transaction costs increase with growing distance of an importer
so we expect this coefficient to be negative.5
ln(populationit) is a logaritm of population in receiving country i in year t.
With growing population demand for foreign exports increases, therefore
we expect the coefficient to have a positive value. Data were obtained
from the International Monetary Fund official database.
ln(riskit) is a logarithm of a political risk of country i in year t. Already
Tinberg (1962) has pointed political risk to be an important obstacle to
international trade flow because it represents an additional transaction
costs. Governments try to stimulate exports by granting export credit
guarantees against export risks, especially political risks (Moser et al.,
2006). This variable was introduced by Moser et al. (2006) in gravity
model estimation. However, we expect the effect of export promotion
to riskier countries to be offset by the volume of export to less risky
countries that are chosen by the majority of exporters. This implies
a positive expected sign of the risk coefficient. We collected political
risk data from International Country Risk Guide database (PRS risk
rating). Data range from 1 to 100, where 100 stands for no risk, the lower
the number, the higher political risk in the country. Other database of
political risk, which is predominantly used also by Czech ECAs for their
internal rating of country risk, is regularly published by OECD. However,
OECD started to publish the database only after year 1999. OECD data
range from 0 to 7 with 0 standing for no risk. We analysed similarity of
the two risk scales in 1999 - 2011 time period that is available. Analysis,
where we used simple OLS regression and regressed PRS rating on OECD
risk rating, is summarized in Table 4.1.
The two datasets proved to be highly correlated (with R-squared 72.12%)
5Source: timeanddate.com
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Note that *, **, *** denote significance
at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
and p-value 0.000 with t-statistics very low (-67.83). Beta coefficient is
negative since two ratings have an opposite scale (0 stands for no risk in
OECD rating but the highest risk in PRS rating). Therefore both risk
ratings futher proved to be suitable for the international trade analysis.
PRS rating is more appropriate for our research because of longer data
availability and more detailed form of rating scale.
4.3 Results
We are going to present results of our gravity models in this section. Datasets
were arranged into unbalanced panel data and we estimated two different mod-
els (fixed effects and random effects model) for EGAP and CEB. Later we
merged the data into one dataset for the period 1993 - 2012. CEB promotion
is set to 0 for the period 1993 - 1995 because CEB had not been established in
this period. Therefore we are able to precisely estimate the effect of foundation
of an export credit agency in a country.
A common approach with panel data is to estimate both random effect and
fixed effect models by GLS regression and then use Hausman test to decide an
appropriate model. Under the null hypothesis of Hausman test, both random
effect and fixed effect models are effective and consistent; the alternative hy-
pothesis rejects the random effect model. We do expect the fixed effect model
to be more consistent with our data because we used a sample of majority of
countries in the world; data were not chosen randomly. Data for smaller un-
derdeveloped countries, such as their GDP, export or political risk, are usually
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not available in international databases and hence they were excluded from our
regression. Fixed effect estimation outweights in working papers dealing with
the gravity equation. Results of our regressions are reported in Table 4.2 that
follows.
Table 4.2: Static GLS regression - the Czech Republic (separate mod-
els)
CEB EGAP
RE FE RE FE
promotion 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.044***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
population 0.944*** 2.035*** 0.910*** 1.878***
(0.058) (0.136) (0.055) (0.116)
GDP 0.083*** 0.058*** 0.088*** 0.061***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
distance -1.816*** -1.780***
(0.101) (0.097)
risk 1.564*** -0.302 1.086*** -0.092
(0.230) (0.277) (0.197) (0.221)
constant 7.788*** -16.578*** 9.653*** -15.214***
(1.708) (2.462) (1.555) (2.167)
n 2115 2115 2442 2442
R2 0.673 0.125 0.655 0.158
Hausman p-value 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s calculation
Note that *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
First, we estimated a static GLS model without lag variables. Random ef-
fect model for CEB and EGAP yeild similar results. All explanatory variables
are significant even on 1% significance level. Positive and significant coefficient
on political risk indicates, that exporters choose ”safer” export destinations to
decrease the probability that they will suffer losses on their investment (such as
failure to receive payment for the delivery of products) due to external events
in the export destination such as government or legislative changes. Although
ECAs focus on pushing exports to more risky destinations, the volume of pro-
moted exports is offset by exports without such promotion. Exports are design
for larger and more developed economies with higher purchasing power and
hence more resources. This fact is supported by the positive coefficient of ex-
planatory variables GDP and population. As expected, negative coefficient of
variable distance suggests that exporters choose geographically closer destina-
tions for their exports to offset both information problem and more importantly,
to decrease transportation costs. Geographical proximity often implies overall
closeness of economies due to similar development and historical tights and
similar market structure. All variables naturally have very similar values in
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CEB and EGAP model.
Variable of interest, export promotion, is significant in both models even on
1% level of significance. Export promotion has positive effect on exports. 1%
increase in credit or bank guarantees from CEB increases exports to respec-
tive destination by 4.6%, increase in insurance coverage of exports by EGAP
increases exports by 3.9%.
Large test statistics in Hausman test (low p-value) suggests that random
effect model is rejected in favour of fixed effect, as we expected.
Political risk variable becomes insignificant in fixed effect model. Effects
of variables population and GDP are both postive, nevertheless, coefficient of
population is much larger than in random effect model. Export promotion is
highly significant with positive effect on export in both models. Its coefficients
have similar value than in case of random effect models, 3.7% in CEB credits
and 4.4% in EGAP insurance. Export promotion in form of export insurance
has a larger effect on the amount of exports than credits and guarantees there-
fore our analysis suggest that it is more perspective and profitable. It must
be also noted that insurance coverage involves fewer financial resources thus it
might be less risky for the ECA financed directly linked to the state budget.
Export fixed effect model is poorly explained by given variables (R-squared
only 15 and 12%) thus we estimate dynamic model (with lag export variable)
to improve the credibitily of the model.
Dynamic GLS models with fixed and random effects with lagged explana-
tory variables report larger R-squared, as Table 4.3 shows. Again, Hausman
test strongly rejects random effect model. All variables have similar effects than
is static models, alhough size of coefficients on promotion decreased. EGAP
insurance again seems more successfull because it increases export by 2.9%
which is more than 2.4% given by CEB promotion.
Next, we merged data from EGAP and CEB databases and estimated both
static (Table 4.4) and dynamic (Table 4.5) models for random and fixed effects
for the period 1996 - 2011. Hausman test rejected random effect model.
The fixed effect specification of the dynamic gravity model prevails in the
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Table 4.3: Dynamic GLS regression - the Czech Republic (separate
models)
CEB EGAP
RE FE RE FE
promotion 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
export lag 0.645*** 0.334*** 0.672*** 0.372***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
population 0.285*** 1.623*** 0.220*** 1.417***
(0.019) (0.122) (0.018) (0.103)
GDP 0.082*** 0.034*** 0.082*** 0.038***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
distance -0.558*** -0.477***
(0.032) (0.029)
risk 1.330*** -0.221 1.114*** -0.088
(0.107) (0.247) (0.098) (0.194)
constant -1.545*** -15.185*** -0.843* -13.262***
(0.566) (2.194) (0.518) (1.894)
n 2104 2104 2426 2426
R2 0.877 0.346 0.882 0.431
Hausman p-value 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s calculation
Note that *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
literature dealing with Central European countries (Janda et al., 2013a, Janda
et al., 2013b). Moser et al. (2008) estimated random effect and Mundlak-
type random effect models applied on data from Germany. However, current
literature that re-estimates effects of German export guarantees (Felbermayr
and Yalcin, 2013) further rejects such specification using Hausman test. Fixed
effect dynamic model fits our data relatively well, R-squared is 43.2%. The
effect of both insurance coverage and export credits and guarantees on exports
is positive and significant and providing support for the hypothesis that export
promotion provided by Czech ECAs lead to higher Czech exports. Effect of
Czech promotion (here 2.1% for CEB and 2.5% EGAP) is comparable with
other relevant literature e.g. by Moser et al. (2008) that concluded that ef-
fect of German guarantees is slightly lower than 2% and by Egger and Url
(2006) who estimated the effect of Austrian export guarantees to be around
4.5%. The coefficients of other explanatory variables are as expected. Czech
companies export more to countries with higher market value, measured by
GDP, and to larger markets that causes higher overall demand for products,
therefore higher demand for foreign exports. Coefficient for distance is negative
in random effect model, distance leads to smaller proximity of two countries,
larger transportation and information costs. Past exports have a positive effect
on the value of exports nowadays, this can be explained by e.g. a persistance
of long-term suppliers contract. Political risk has an ambiguous and no clear
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Table 4.4: Static GLS regression - the Czech Republic (single model)
RE FE
promotion CEB 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.006)
















Note that *, **, *** denote significance at 10%,
5%, 1% level, respectively.
effect on exports, the variable tends to be nonsignificant in fixed effect model.
An auxiliary random effect GLS regression (Hausman test suggested random
effect to be more efficient) of export promotion on political risk was further
estimated. Coefficient of political risk was significant and negative, suggesting
that Czech export promotion instruments are indeed designated for more risky
export territories. Note that fixed effect estimation yields downward-biased
estimates when a lagged dependent variable is included (Moser et al., 2008).
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Table 4.5: Dynamic GLS regression - the Czech Republic (single
model)
RE FE
promotion CEB 0.007 0.021***
(0.006) (0.005)
promotion EGAP 0.022*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004)
















Note that *, **, *** denote significance at 10%,
5%, 1% level, respectively.
Chapter 5
Analysis of ECAs in the three
Visegrad countries
This chapter extends the gravity model introduced in the previous chapter.
Data from Slovakia and Poland are included. We collected almost 13000 ob-
servations, out of which 8747 include values for complete set of variables. We
introduce a new approach that combines databases of three countries into one
model based on the gravity equation of international trade. Different techniques
are used for the estimation, namely fixed and random effect GLS model, least
squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach and Poisson pseudo-maximum like-
lihood estimator (PPML).
This chapter is divided as follows. First, we describe the new dataset with
data from Slovak Eximbanka and Polish KUKE. Empirical methods and results
of different analysis follow. We test and evaluate effect of 5 ECAs in Visegrad
region and compare their performance.
5.1 Model and Data
Previously introduced equation with additional variables form a baseline equa-
tion in this analysis.
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ln(exportit) = β0 + β1 ln(promotionit) + β2 ln(GDPit) +
+ β3 ln(distancei) + β4 ln(populationit) +
+ β5 ln(riskit) + β6(CZ) + β7(PL) +
+ β8(bank) + β9(insurance) + β10(bankproduct) + µi + µt + εit
As in the previous chapter, t stands for a year, i stands for a receiving
country destination, µi is a country specific error term, µt is a time specific er-
ror term and εit stands for an error term with zero mean and constant variance.
Data used in the analysis come from different sources. Dependant variable
is ln(exportit). Data for the variable of interest, ln(promotionit), were kindly
provided by EGAP, CEB, KUKE and Eximbanka. The variable stands for log-
arithm of the sum of various sources of promotion either in form of bank credit
and guarantees or insurance coverage. Data for Eximanka are available for the
period 1994 - 2012 for insurance coverage and for the period 2009 - 2012 for
banking products. The latter have been processed by Eximbanka only in recent
years. Data from Polish KUKE are available for the analysis for the period 2002
- 2010. Again, we have observations for period 1993 - 2012 for Czech EGAP
and 1996 - 2012 for CEB. For detailed description of variables ln(exportit),
ln(distancei), ln(GDPit), ln(promotionit), ln(populationit) and ln(riskit) see
Section 4.2.
We added several dummy variables to the model to differentiate effect of
the three countries, type of the institution and product.
CZ and PL determinate domestic country of the exporter. For Slovakia, both
variables equal 0.
bank and insurance determinate the type of ECA. For CEB, bank is set to
1 and insurance is 0. In case of EGAP and KUKE, bank equals 0 and
insurance equals 1. Both dummy variables are set to 1 for Eximbanka
since this institution is a mixture of a bank and an insurance company
and provides products of both types.
5. Analysis of ECAs in the three Visegrad countries 40
bankproduct is set to 1 when we deal with bank product, namely credit,
guarantee or refinancing, it is 0 otherwise.
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and
number of observation) are summarized in Table 5.1. Our dataset contains
more panel observations for country-year pairs (e.g. CEB and EGAP data for
year 2000 for each exporting destination or Eximbanka’s insurance and banking
product for year 2011), thus we created a new variable as an interaction term
for country, bank and bankproduct variables and used this variable to define
our data as panel data in statistical software.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics - the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Poland
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
export 11499 3.93*108 2.1619 3 5.22*1010
promotion 12774 5952647 4.07*107 0 1.26*109
population 12199 3.57*107 1.32*108 13848 1.35*109
gdp 11316 1.50*1013 1.43*1014 7.20*107 3.06*1015
distance 12747 5625.839 3831.317 0 18197
risk 9526 61.608 17.038 11 100
5.2 Results
First, we estimated the model using fixed effects. For comparison, model with
random GLS effects is reported, nevertheless, the latter was strongly rejected
by Hausman test. The countries for the analysis were not chosen randomly,
missing data tend to occur in case of less developed countries and those are
excluded from the analysis. Table 5.2 presents the results of the GLS regression
analysis.
We estimated the static model using 8474 observations, 8286 observations
were used in the dynamic model. All variables in fixed effect static model are
significant on 1% significance level with the exception of the political risk. Po-
litical risk is significant on 5% significance level, although this variable is no
longer significant in dynamic fixed effect model. After including the lag value
of the dependant variable, export, R-squared noticeably increased (from 14%
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Table 5.2: GLS regression - the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland
Static Dynamic
RE FE RE FE
export lag 0.802*** 0.493***
(0.006) (0.009)
promotion 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.026*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
population 0.875*** 2.089*** 0.104*** 1.307***
(0.031) (0.076) (0.009) (0.069)
GDP 0.086*** 0.058*** 0.047*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
distance -1.685*** -0.237***
(0.053) (0.015)
risk 1.393*** -0.288** 0.566*** -0.156
(0.123) (0.148) (0.051) (0.129)
constant 7.920*** -18.052*** -0.035 -13.197***
(0.898) (1.409) (0.262) (1.243)
n 8474 8474 8286 8286
R2 0.639 0.135 0.902 0.526
Hausman p-value 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s calculation
Note that *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
to 53%), lag value of the dependant variable highly explains variations of the
variable export as expected. Variable aggregate export promotion is signifi-
cant and positive. Its coefficients suggest that an increase of newly covered
business by 1% causes additional increase of exports by about 5.7% (static
model) and 3.7% (dynamic model). Thus export promotion in three Visegrad
countries proved to have an important effect on export from those countries.
Our analysis showed that gravity equation of international trade fit data from
Visegrad countries. Domestic companies export more to countries with larger
markets size (measured by GDP) and to more populous countries (measured
by population) because the two factors lead to higher demand for goods and
indeed cause more opportunities for an exporter. The volume of export is neg-
atively influenced by the distance of capitals of two countries (in random effect
model).1 Transport and information costs are an important factor for Viseg-
rad exporter when choosing a potential destination for their goods or services.
Political risk has a negative effect on the volume of exports. A possible expla-
nation is that our dataset covers a long period including a turbulent period of
transition of Visegrad countries and other Eastern European countries. Due
to unstable conditions during the transition period, Eastern and Central Eu-
ropean countries were evaluated as more risky. At the same time, Central and
Eastern European countries were main destination for Visegrad exporters. If
1Data for distance were obtained by taking logarithm of the distance from Prague, Warsaw
and Bratislava.
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we analysed shorter, more recent period, the coefficient of political risk would
be likely to have a positive value.
To overcome the problem of exclusion of time-invariant variables from the
fixed effect model, we estimated least squared dummy variables (hereinunder:
LSVD) model. LSDV estimator whereby the unobserved individual character-
istics are captured by sets of dummy variables for exporter-importer country
pair and exporter time, importer-time country-time specific effects (Greene,
2014). The LSVD model is defined by







where Xit denotes a full set of explanatory variables described above, Cj is
a set of dummy variables identifying country destinations and Ys are dummy
variables denoting respective year. This model does not omit variables constant
over time, therefore the explanatory variable distance and previously defined
dummy variables are excluded from our analysis. Results of the LSDV analysis
are reported in Table 5.3.

























Note that *, **, *** denote significance at
10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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LSDV model reports high R-squared (90.4%). However, a lot of variation is
captured by dummy variables, F-test of joint significance of dummy variables
yeilds high test statistics hence dummy variables are jointly significant. Effect
of export promotion is smaller than in GLS model, 1% increase in export pro-
motion (in form of banking products and insurance coverage) causes volume
of exports to increase by 2.5%. Population and GDP do not have significant
impact on exports. Moreover, dummy variables describing the type of product
and the institution do not have significant coefficients suggesting that exports
are influenced similarly by both export promotion in form of insurance cover-
age and bank product. All types of ECAs institutional type have comparable
influence on exports, whereas volume of exports is affected by the exporter’s
domestic country. Polish economy is the largest from the three observed Viseg-
rad countries thus it is natural that Polish exports form the highest portion of
all observed exports.
To overcome the problem of insignificance of key gravity model variables
while estimating the LSDV model (due to numerous dummy variables), Bal-
tagi et al. (2014) suggest the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML)
estimator. PPLM estimator for the (two-way) cross-sectional model can also
be applied to the two-way (or even three-way) panel models with a large num-
ber of country pairs and a small number of time periods (N >> S) (Baltagi
et al., 2014), as in our case. To account for possible heteroskedasticity, Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) recommend estimating the gravity model in lev-
els rather than in logs. An advantage of this strategy is that information on
zero bilateral trade (or in our case - export promotion) (Baltagi et al., 2014)
may be used when identifying parameters without loosing some observations
or creating inaccuracies by changes 0 value to 1. Results on PPML analysis in
logaritmical form are reported in Table 5.4.
We analyse results of logarithmical form of PPML for clearer compar-
ison with previous models and more intuitive interpretation of coefficients.
Since PPML model was found to have an appropriate specification for our
data, we extended the analysis. Four interaction variables were added to the
PPML model to estimate effects of performance of ECA in the three countries,
namely promotionit ∗ cr, promotionit ∗pl, promotionit ∗ bank and promotionit ∗
bankingproduct. The final model fits data well (R-squared=62.5%), all ex-
planatory variables except variable promotionit∗bank are significant. Moreover,
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Note that *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
all variables have expected sign of their respective coefficients. PPML model
reports lower values of the variable of interest - export promotion. 1% change
in export promotion positively influences Slovak exports by 0.7% in case of
insurance coverage provided by Eximbanka and by 0.007-0.002=0.005 or 0.5%
for Eximbanka banking products. Czech export promotion provided by EGAP
(insurance coverage) effects the volume of their exports by 0.007-0.003=0.004
thus 0.4% and by CEB by 0.007-0.003-0.002=0.002 or 0.2%. Analogically, Pol-
ish KUKE insurance coverage increases Polish exports by 0.007-0.002=0.005 or
0.5%. Coefficients of other explanatory variables have expected signs and their
influance on export was discussed previously.
The magnitude of impact of ECAs in Visegrad countries is comparable with
Auboin and Engemann (2012). They estimated that 1% increase in trade credit
granted by the Berne Union members to a country leads to a 0.4% increase in
real imports of that country.
5. Analysis of ECAs in the three Visegrad countries 45
We conclude that given the form of our dataset, PPLM estimator is appro-
priate and prefered. Values of coefficients in PPLM model suggest that both
coefficients obtained by GLS and LSDV regression models were overestimated.
Extended dataset provides evidence in favour of the conclusion derived in the
previous chapter - export promotion in form of insurance coverage is more ef-
fective than banking instruments promoting exports. The export credit agency
performing the most effectively on the territory of Visegrad Four is Slovak Ex-
imbanka, followed by Polish KUKE and the two Czech export credit agencies.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Empirical literature dealing with role of export credit agencies is very small.
This thesis makes a valuable contribution to current literature by analysing
a homogenous group of small, open economies with historical proximities but
different export promotion schemes. The impact of export promotion on adi-
tional volume of exports is analysed in European post-Communist countries
throughout the whole transition period and turmoil period of financial crisis in
recent years until year 2012. We focus on Visegrad countries.
The thesis is divided into three sections. First section provides theoretical
backround to the analysis of export credit agencies. The second section uses the
example of the Czech Republic and investigates the effect of different forms of
export credit agencies. The last section merges datasets from three countries
- the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland and using advanced econometric
methods analyses the performance of export credit agencies in the region.
Exporters face multiple obstacles when entering foreign markets, e.g. incom-
plete information, political unrest or financial frictions. Government support
exporting domestic companies to boost exports, hence the economy. Incentives
for such public policies have emerged after the outbreak of the recent financial
crisis. To prevent undesirable war of export subsidies and extremly advanta-
geous credit terms, there was a need for international consensus. The OECD
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits and the Berne Union were
established.
We divided countries according to their level of development, measured
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by Human Development Index 2012, into four categories: highly developed
countries, developed, less developed and the least developed countries. A dis-
tribution of exports towards each category of countries is approximately stable
with decreasing share of exports to highly developed countries in favour of
developed countries (in case of Poland and Hungary), whereas a distribution
of export insurance promotion is very volatile. Decreasing share of insurance
contracts to the least developed countries suggests that ECAs in the region
tend to shift their insurance activities towards more commercial, less risky and
marketable activities.
Data from three Visegrad countries provide evidence in favour of the hy-
pothesis proposed by Chauffour et al. (2010) that ECAs worldwide successfully
supported trade flows during the financial crisis and prevent financial markets
from drying up. Visegrad export promotion in form of insurance and guar-
antees clearly follows trends in development of export volumes. Drop in both
exports and insurance occured in 2009, fall in export was indeed much higher
(-22% drop in exports and -10% drop in insurance coverage).
Gravity model of international trade fits data from the Czech Republic.
Traditional explanatory variables (GDP, population, distance) are highly sig-
nificant with expected signs of their coefficients. The effect of financial instru-
ments provided by two forms of ECAs, namely bank and insurance company,
on a volume of exports was estimated and compared using multiple specifica-
tions of gravity equation in extended time period 1993 - 2012 including almost
all complete years of operation of Czech ECAs. Both types of ECAs led to
additional exports, hence ECAs are successful in boosting international trade
in the region. Insurance coverage and guarantees create slightly more addi-
tional exports (2.5%) than credit and financing (2.1%). Along with multiple
advantages that ECAs providing insurance products have (such as low riskiness
and sustainability), it is concluded that ECA in form of a insurance company
is more effective and it creates more benefits for the governements.
An extensive dataset using data provided by five ECAs from the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Poland contains almost 13000 observations. After om-
miting missing values, 8474 observations were further analysed. Dataset covers
period 1993 - 2012 for Slovakia and the Czech Republic and 2002 - 2011 for
Poland. Dynamic fixed effect GLS model was analogically estimated. Since
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fixed effect models ommit time invariant variables, in order to improve ob-
tained results, LSDV approach was used. A disadvantage of LSDV approach
is that large set of dummy variables has a significant impact on the volatility
of the explained variable, moreover, many explanatory gravity model variables
did not have significant coefficients with desirable signs. Thus PPML model
was estimated resulting in high R-squared and significant variables in lines
with traditional gravity equation. PPML confirms results presented in previ-
ous chapter - ECA in form of insurance company performs more effectively.
The ECA with a currently most successful performance is Slovak Eximbanka.
1% increase in Eximbanka’s financial activities creates 0.7% (insurance prod-
ucts) and 0.5% (bank products) of additional volume of exports, followed by
Polish KUKE (0.5%), EGAP (0.4%) and CEB (0.2%).
An alternative ad more complex solution to gravity models estimation is
non-linear generalized method of moments estimation, proposed by Greene et
al. (2014). This approach also avoids well-known problems of the fixed effects
approach, such as the huge loss of degrees of freedom, identification of the ef-
fects of all covariates, estimation on large data sets etc. Moreover, it provides
consistent parameter estimates in the face of potential endogeneity, so long as
the moment conditions used are valid.
Alternatively, analysis of export credit guarantees might be extended by
using firm-level data. This approach is recommended in current literature in
line with working papers published by Badinger and Url (2013), Felbermayr
and Yalcin (2013) and Volpe and Carballo (2010). The authors used firm-level
data and different matching techniques with treated (firms benefiting from ex-
port subsidy) and control groups. Nevertheless, it is extremely complicated to
access microeconomic data on firm level because they are classified as sensitive
and nonpublic and they are protected by bank secrets in case of Slovak and
Czech jurisdictions.
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Appendix A
International Trade in Visegrad
Four Countries
A. International Trade in Visegrad Four Countries II
Table A.1: Export outflows
1 2 3 4 TOTAL
Czech Republic
1994 11974 652 538 52 13215
1995 19060 923 487 60 20530
1996 18944 989 472 68 20473
1997 19942 894 405 52 21294
1998 25179 1074 431 59 26744
1999 24998 841 353 76 26268
2000 26854 1162 391 53 28459
2001 30943 1187 452 61 32643
2002 40892 1599 728 79 43298
2003 45277 1750 652 58 47738
2004 60652 2692 972 127 64443
2005 70013 3485 1271 167 74936
2006 84965 4675 1590 226 91456
2007 108820 6229 2468 248 117766
2008 127098 7966 2663 451 138177
2009 98937 5748 2647 320 107652
2010 114365 6853 3525 380 125123
2011 143404 8740 4181 395 156720
2012 135714 9681 4043 369 149808
Slovakia
1994 5722 344 225 20 6311
1995 7228 493 191 28 7940
1996 6563 390 114 12 7078
1997 8384 527 119 18 9048
1998 9612 468 91 7 10179
1999 9381 377 101 39 9897
2000 11108 429 158 24 11719
2001 11824 447 132 30 12432
2002 13516 563 136 20 14234
2003 17640 855 238 16 18748
2004 22079 1201 262 33 23576
2005 24490 1671 383 58 26602
2006 32006 2379 517 83 34985
2007 39677 3677 850 104 44308
2008 37858 4945 1166 114 44083
2009 29948 3754 1207 99 35008
2010 46379 4396 1723 88 52586
2011 56690 5024 2530 98 64341
2012 67439 5077 2226 109 74852
Source: Comtrade, HDI, author’s calculation
A. International Trade in Visegrad Four Countries III
Table A.2: Export outflows, cont.
1 2 3 4 TOTAL
Poland
1993 11161 883 522 169 12734
1994 13638 935 442 102 15116
1995 18506 1671 509 115 20802
1996 19203 1909 605 159 21876
1997 19720 2291 621 118 22749
1998 23033 2128 481 93 25735
1999 24103 1710 537 211 26562
2000 27386 1887 461 176 29910
2001 18471 2333 600 265 21670
2002 35289 2625 552 198 38664
2003 44283 3668 721 172 48843
2004 60080 5534 1368 222 67204
2005 71270 7222 1838 281 80611
2006 85946 10052 2099 301 98399
2007 115029 13614 2456 444 131543
2008 131221 17106 3360 364 152051
2009 107554 11311 3355 558 122778
2010 122287 13739 3780 705 140511
2011 140437 17060 4600 523 162620
2012 66195 18221 4670 686 89773
Hungary
1993 6123 706 206 39 7075
1994 42168 4167 995 220 47549
1995 9605 1138 248 47 11038
1996 9946 953 200 43 11143
1997 15657 1077 202 45 16980
1998 19436 1448 236 30 21150
1999 22883 1288 234 36 24442
2000 25118 1574 230 27 26949
2001 27049 1856 367 30 29303
2002 30508 2193 430 62 33192
2003 37078 2746 546 79 40449
2004 47339 4218 866 80 52502
2005 49150 5779 1204 220 56353
2006 55010 8350 1848 449 65657
2007 70888 10953 2441 506 84788
2008 75436 14217 2640 319 92613
2009 60003 9861 2260 109 72233
2010 68258 12101 3080 135 83574
2011 79704 15113 4007 231 99055
2012 75974 14788 3635 374 94771
Source: Comtrade, HDI, author’s calculation
Appendix B
Portfolio of Products
Table B.1: Bank products
CR SK PL HU
Pre-export credit Yes Yes No No
Direct export supplier credit Yes Yes No Yes
Direct export buyer credit Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indirect export buyer credit Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit for investment abroad Yes Yes No Yes
Refinancing of supplier’s export credit Yes Yes No Yes
Refinancing of buyer’s export credit Yes No No Yes
Forfaiting Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchase of export insured receivables Yes No Yes No
Non-payment bank guarantees Yes Yes Yes No
Payment bank guarantees No Yes No No
Source: Janda et al., 2013b
B. Portfolio of Products V
Table B.2: Insurance products
Insurance of CR SK PL HU
Short Term Export Supplier Credit Yes Yes No Yes
Short Term Export Supplier Credit Financed by a Bank Yes No No Yes
Medium and Long Term Export Supplier Credit Yes Yes Yes No
Medium and Long Term Export Supplier Credit Financed
by a Bank Yes No No No
Export Buyer Credit Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confirmed Letter of Credit Yes Yes No No
Credit for Pre Export Financing Yes Yes No No
Investment of Domestic Legal Persons Abroad Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit for the Financing of Investments of Yes Yes No No
Domestic Legal Persons Abroad
Prospection of Foreign Markets Yes No No No
against the Risk of Inability to Fulfil an Export Contract Yes Yes No No
Bank Guarantees Issued in Relation to an Export Contract Yes Yes No Yes
Short Term Export Receivables No No Yes No
Leasing No No Yes Yes
Source: Janda et al., 2013b
